VETO POWER

A veto, or in Latin for "I forbid", is the power of an officer of the state to
unilaterally stop a piece of legislation.
In practice, the veto can be absolute (as in the U.N. Security Council, whose
permanent members (the China, the United Kingdom, France, Russia, and United
States) can block any resolution, or limited, as in the legislative process of the
United States, where a two-thirds vote in both the House and Senate may
override a Presidential veto of legislation). A veto gives power, possibly unlimited,
to stop changes, but not to adopt them. The influence that the veto conveys to its
holder is therefore directly proportional to the holder's conservatism, broadly
defined. The more the holder of a veto supports the status quo, the more useful
the veto. The concept of a veto body originated with the Roman consuls and
tribunes. Either of the two consuls holding office in a given year could block a
military or civil decision by the other; any tribune had the power to unilaterally
block legislation passed by the Roman Senate
Roman veto
The institution of the veto, known as the intercession, was adopted by the Roman
Republic in the 6th century BC as a way of enabling the tribunes to protect the
interests of the plebs (common citizenry) from the encroachments of the
patricians, who dominated the Senate. A tribune's veto did not prevent the senate
from passing a bill, but meant that it was denied the force of law. The tribunes
could also use the veto to prevent a bill from being brought before the plebeian
assembly. The consuls also had the power of veto, as decision making generally
required the assent of both consuls. If one disagreed, either could invoke the
intercession to block the action of the other. The veto was an essential
component of the Roman conception of power being wielded not only to manage
state affairs but to moderate and restrict the power of the state's high officials
and institution.
Westminster systems
In Westminster Systems and most constitutional monarchies, the power to veto
legislation by withholding the Royal Assent is a rarely used reserve power of the
monarch. In practice, the Crown follows the convention of exercising its
prerogative on the advice of its chief advisor, the prime minister.
The House of Lords used to have the power of veto. However, reform first by a
Liberal government and then by a Labour government has seen their powers
limited. The Parliamentary Acts of 1911 and 1949 saw their powers reduced to
being able to amend and delay legislation. They are able to delay legislation for
up to one year. Under the 1911 Act, money bills may not be delayed, and under
the Salisbury Convention, they cannot delay any bills laid out in the party's
manifesto.
In Spain, the article 115 of the Constitution provides that the King shall give his
assent to Laws passed by the General Courts within 15 days after their final
passing by them; the absence of the Royal Assent, although not constitutionally
provided, would mean the bill not to become Law.
Australia
Since the Statute of Westminster (1931), the United Kingdom Parliament may not
repeal any Act of the Parliament of the Commonwealth of Australia on the
grounds that are repugnant to the laws and interests of the United Kingdom.
Other countries in the Commonwealth of Nations (not to be confused with the
Commonwealth of Australia), such as Canada and New Zealand, are likewise
affected. However, according to the Australian Constitution (sec. 59), the Queen
may veto a bill that has been given royal assent by the Governor-General within
one year of the legislation being assented to.This power has never been used. The
Australian Governor-General himself or herself has, in theory, power to veto, or
more technically, withhold assent to, a bill passed by both houses of the
Australian Parliament, and contrary to the advice of the prime minister. This may
be done without consulting the sovereign as per Section 58 of the constitution,
"Royal assent to Bills. Recommendations by Governor-General - When a proposed
law passed by both Houses of Parliament is presented to the Governor-General
for the Queen’s assent, he shall declare, according to his discretion, but subject to
this Constitution, that he assents in the Queen’s name, or that he withholds
assent, or that he reserves the law for the Queen’s pleasure. The Governor-
General may return to the House in which it originated any proposed law so
presented to him, and may transmit therewith any amendments which he may
recommend, and the Houses may deal with the recommendation" This reserve
power is however, constitutionally arguable, and it is difficult to foresee an
occasion when such a power would need to be exercised. It is possible that a
Governor-general might so act if a bill passed by the Parliament was criminal,
illegal or in violation of the Constitution. One might argue, however, that a
government would be hardly likely to present a bill which is so open to rejection.
Many of the vice-regal reserve powers are untested, because of the brief
constitutional history of the Commonwealth of Australia, and the observance of
the convention that the head of state acts upon the advice of his or her chief
minister.
With regard to the six governors of the states which are federated under the
Australian Commonwealth, a somewhat different situation exists. Until the
Australia Act 1986, each state was constitutionally dependent upon the British
Crown directly. Since 1986, however, they are fully independent entities,
although the Queen still appoints governors on the advice of the state head of
government, the premier. So the Crown may not veto (nor the UK Parliament
overturn) any act of a state governor or state legislature. Paradoxically, the states
are more independent of the Crown than the federal government and legislature.
State constitutions determine what role a governor plays. In general, the
governor exercises the powers the sovereign would have, including the power to
withhold the Royal Assent.
United Kingdom
In the United Kingdom, the royal veto ("withholding Royal Assent") was last
exercised in 1707 by Queen Anne with the Scottish Militia Bill 1708.
Canada
According to the British North America Act, 1867, the Governor General of Canada
may veto a bill by refusing Royal Assent. If the Governor General withholds the
Queen's assent, the sovereign may within two years, disallow the bill, thereby
vetoing the law in question. However, this power has never been used.
Provincial viceroys, Lieutenant Governors, however are able to reserve Royal
Assent to provincial bills for the governor general; this clause was last invoked in
1961 by the Lieutenant Governor of Saskatchewan.
United States
All legislation passed by both houses of Congress must be presented to the
President. This presentation is in the President's capacity as Head of State.
If the President approves of the legislation, he signs it (sign into law). If he does
not approve, he must return the bill, unsigned, within ten days, excluding
Sundays, to the house of the United States Congress in which it originated, while
the Congress is in session. The President is constitutionally required to state his
objections to the legislation in writing, and the Congress is constitutionally
required to consider them, and to reconsider the legislation. This action, in effect,
is a veto.
If the Congress overrides the veto by a two-thirds majority in each house, it
becomes law without the President's signature. Otherwise, the bill fails to become
law unless it is presented to the President again and he chooses to sign it.
A bill can also become law without the President's signature if, after it is
presented to him, he simply fails to sign it within the ten days noted. If there are
fewer than ten days left in the session before Congress adjourns, and if Congress
does so adjourn before the ten days have expired in which the President might
sign the bill, then the bill fails to become law. This procedure, when used as a
formal device, is called a pocket veto.
Modifications declared unconstitutional
In 1996, the Congress passed, and President Bill Clinton signed, the Line Item
Veto Act of 1996. This act allowed the President to veto individual items of
budgeted expenditures from appropriations bills instead of vetoing the entire bill
and sending it back to the Congress. However, this line-item veto was
immediately challenged by members of Congress who disagreed with it. In 1998,
the Supreme Court declared that the line-item veto was unconstitutional. The
Court found the language of the Constitution required each bill presented to the
President to be either approved or rejected as a whole. An action by which the
President might pick and choose which parts of the bill to approve or not approve
amounted to the President acting as a legislator instead of an executive and head
of state - and particularly as a single legislator acting in place of the entire
Congress - thereby violating the separation of powers doctrine. In 2006, Senator
Bill Frist introduced the Legislative Line Item Veto Act of 2006 in the United
States Senate. Rather than provide for an actual legislative veto, however, the
procedure created by the Act provides that, if the President should recommend
rescission of a budgetary line item from a budget bill he previously signed into
law - a power he already possesses pursuant to U.S. Const. Art. II - the Congress
must vote on his request within ten days. Because the legislation that is the
subject of the President's request (or "Special Message," in the language of the
bill) was already enacted and signed into law, the vote by the Congress would be
ordinary legislative action, not any kind of veto - whether line-item, legislative or
any other sort. The House passed this measure, but the Senate never considered
it, so the bill expired and never became law.
In 1982, the Supreme Court had struck down the one-house legislative veto, also
on separation of powers grounds and on grounds that the action by one house of
Congress violated the Constitutional requirement of bicameralism. The case was
INS v. Chadha, concerning a foreign exchange student in Ohio who had been born
in Kenya but whose parents were from India. Because he was not born in India,
he was not an Indian citizen. Because his parents were not Kenyan citizens, he
was not Kenyan. Thus, he had nowhere to go when his student visa expired
because neither country would take him, so he overstayed his visa and was
ordered to show cause why he should not be deported from the United States.
The Immigration and Nationality Act was one of many acts of Congress passed
since the 1930s, which contained a provision allowing either house of that
legislature to nullify decisions of agencies in the executive branch simply by
passing a resolution. In this case, Chadha's deportation was suspended and the
House of Representatives passed a resolution overturning the suspension, so that
the deportation proceedings would continue. This, the Court held, amounted to
the House of Representatives passing legislation without the concurrence of the
Senate, and without presenting the legislation to the President for consideration
and approval (or veto). Thus, the Constitutional principle of bicameralism and the
separation of powers doctrine were disregarded in this case, and this legislative
veto of executive decisions was struck down.
Early federal history
The Presidents of the Continental Congress (1774 - 1781) did not have the power
of veto. Nor could the President veto an act of Congress under the Articles of
Confederation (1781 - 1789), though he possessed certain recess and reserve
powers that were not necessarily available to the predecessor President of
Continental Congress. But with the enactment of the United States Constitution
(drafted 1787; ratified 1788; fully effective since 4 March 1789), veto power was
conferred upon the person titled "President of the United States."
The presidential veto power was first exercised on April 5, 1792 when George
Washington vetoed a bill designed to apportion representatives among the several
states. The Congress first overrode a presidential veto - that is, passed a bill into
law notwithstanding the President's objections - on March 3, 1845.
U.S. states and amendatory veto
Most U.S. states also have a provision by which legislative decisions can be
vetoed by the governor. In addition, most of these states allow the governor to
exercise a line-item veto.
In seven U.S. states, the governor has an amendatory veto. For example, in
Illinois, the governor can make specific recommendations for changes to a bill.
The state legislature can then approve the changes by majority vote, or override
the amendatory veto with a 60% majority. No law is passed if the legislature does
not accept the changes.
Presidential veto
Parliamentary republics in Europe, including Italy, Portugal, Ireland, France,
Latvia, the Ukraine, and Hungary often allow a form of limited presidential veto
on legislation.
The President of Austria does not technically have veto power. However, the
president can order a referendum on a bill passed by the legislature if they refuse
to sign it.
The President of Iceland can refuse to sign a bill which is then put to universal
adult suffrage. The president has only twice refused to sign a bill, and a
referendum has only been held once.
The President of Ireland can refuse to grant assent to a bill which he/she
considers to be unconstitutional, after first consulting the Council of State; in this
case the bill is referred to the Supreme Court of Ireland, which finally determines
the matter. This is the most widely used reserve power. The President may also,
on request of a majority of the Senate and a third of Dáil Éireann (opposition
parties), and after consulting the council of state, decline to sign a bill that he/she
believes is "of such national importance that the will of the people thereon ought
to be ascertained" in a referendum, or a new Dáil Éireann reassembling after a
general election held within eight months. This latter power has never been used
due to the fact that the government of the day almost always commands a
majority of the Senate preventing the third of Dáil Éireann that usually makes up
the opposition from combining with it.
The President of Italy
can request a second deliberation of a bill passed by
Parliament before it is promulgated. This is very weak form of veto, as the
exists in France and Latvia. While such a limited veto cannot thwart the will of a
determined parliamentary majority, it may have a delaying effect, and may cause
the parliamentary majority to reconsider the matter. In Italy, the President of
Republic can also call new Parliament elections. That makes stronger his position.
The President of Portugal can refuse to sign a bill or refer it or parts of it to the
Portuguese Constitutional Court. If the President refuses to sign bill without it
being declared unconstitutional, the Assembly of the Republic (parliament) can
pass it again and it becomes law regardless of the President's opinion.
The President of Latvia may suspend a bill for a period of two months, during
which it may be referred to the people in a referendum if a certain number of
signatures are gathered. This is potentially a much stronger form of veto, as it
enables the President to appeal to the people against the wishes of the Parliament
and Government.
The President of Ukraine can refuse to sign a bill and return it to Parliament with
his proposals. If the parliament agrees on his proposals, the President should sign
the bill. Parliament can overturn a veto by 2/3 majority. If the parliament
overturns his veto, the President should sign the bill. If he fails to do so in 10
days, then the Chairman of the Parliament signs it.
The President of Hungary has two options to veto a bill: S/he may submit it to the
Constitutional Court in case of any suspicion that it violates the constitution, or
s/he may send it back to the Parliament and ask for a second debate and vote on
the bill. If the Court rules that the bill is not unconstitutional or it is passed by the
Parliament again, respectively, the President must sign it.
Parliament can override the veto by an ordinary majority. The same provision
exists in France and Latvia. While such a limited veto cannot thwart the will of a
determined parliamentary majority, it may have a delaying effect, and may cause
the parliamentary majority to reconsider the matter. In Italy, the President of
Republic can also call new Parliament elections. That makes stronger his position.
The President of Portugal can refuse to sign a bill or refer it or parts of it to the
Portuguese Constitutional Court. If the President refuses to sign bill without it
being declared unconstitutional, the Assembly of the Republic (parliament) can
pass it again and it becomes law regardless of the President's opinion.
The President of Latvia may suspend a bill for a period of two months, during
which it may be referred to the people in a referendum if a certain number of
signatures are gathered. This is potentially a much stronger form of veto, as it
enables the President to appeal to the people against the wishes of the Parliament
and Government.
The President of Ukraine can refuse to sign a bill and return it to Parliament with
his proposals. If the parliament agrees on his proposals, the President should sign
the bill. Parliament can overturn a veto by 2/3 majority. If the parliament
overturns his veto, the President should sign the bill. If he fails to do so in 10
days, then the Chairman of the Parliament signs it.
The President of Hungary has two options to veto a bill: S/he may submit it to the
Constitutional Court in case of any suspicion that it violates the constitution, or
s/he may send it back to the Parliament and ask for a second debate and vote on
the bill. If the Court rules that the bill is not unconstitutional or it is passed by the Parliament again, respectively, the President must sign it.
Liberum veto
In the constitution of seventeenth- and eighteenth-century Poland, there was an
institution called the liberum veto. All bills had to pass the Sejm (Parliament) by
unanimous consent, and if any legislator voted nay on anything, this not only
vetoed that bill but dissolved that legislative session itself. The concept originated
in the idea of "Polish democracy", that any Pole of noble extraction was as good
as any other, no matter how low or high his material condition might be. It was
never exercised in practice under the rule of the strong Polish royal dynasties, but
these came to an end in the mid-17th century, and were followed by an elective
kingship. As might be expected, the more and more frequent use of this veto
power paralyzed the power of the legislature, and, combined with a string of weak
figurehead kings, led ultimately to the partitioning and dissolution of the Polish
state in the following century.